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This paper reports on a survey of municipal commonage users, which was undertaken 
in Philippolis in the southern Free State, in May 2005. The survey showed that a 
significant number of commonage users are committed to their farming enterprises, as 
shown by five proxy indicators: Their readiness to plough their income into their 
farming enterprises; their sale of livestock; their desire for more land, and their 
willingness to pay rental to secure such land; their desire to farm on their own; and 
their desire to own their own land. The paper reflects on the significance of commonage 
in the context of the South African government’s land reform policy, and argues that 
commonage can transcend survivalist or subsistence production, and can be used as a 
“stepping stone” for emergent farmers to access their own land parcels. Finally, the 
paper argues that, if commonage is to become a key part in a “step-up” strategy of land 
reform, then appropriately sized land parcels should be made available for commonage 
users, to enable them to “exit” from commonage use and invest in smallholdings or 
small farms. 
 
1. Introduction  and  background 
 
In the southern provinces of South Africa, municipalities own vast tracts of 
agricultural land. This phenomenon is primarily found in rural towns in the 
Western Cape, Eastern Cape, Northern Cape and the Free State. Many modern 
municipalities inherited public land from their 19th Century predecessors. In 
some cases, this land comprised church assets, which were later sold to 
municipalities.  
 
‘Municipal commonages’ originated at the time that towns were formally 
established (DLA 2006: 6), usually in the 19th and early 19th centuries. As part 
of the process, the State granted village or town councils significant tracts of 
land that surrounded the residential settlement. The land was available for the 
use of the towns’ residents, typically to keep animals for slaughter, draught 
 
1 Visiting Professor, Centre for Development Support, University of the Free State and Vrije 
Universiteit, Amsterdam respectively. 
  437Agrekon, Vol 45, No 4 (December 2006)  Atkinson & Büscher 
 
 
                                                
animals and milk cows. It was generally reserved only for white residents. By 
the mid-20th Century, white urban residents tended to lose interest in small-
scale agriculture, and commonages were increasingly let to commercial 
farmers, close to market-related rentals. The land was attractive, because it 
was located close to town (and facilities such as abattoirs), and at that stage, 
there was a very low crime rate in and around the towns.  
 
Municipalities benefited from this arrangement because it involved low 
management costs, and yielded significant rentals. Typically, the land was put 
out to tender, and municipalities selected the highest bidders. This formed a 
valuable source of municipal revenue. 
 
The case discussed in this paper resembles many formal towns in the Free 
State, Northern Cape, Eastern Cape and Western Cape.2 The histories and 
experiences of these towns have been broadly similar, and their commonage 
situation today shares many of the same characteristics (DLA 2005). These 
towns have municipal commonages which are located on the peripheries of 
towns. After 1996, municipalities increasingly chose to terminate the leases 
with commercial farmers, and they began making the land available to the 
new class of urban poor – the urban black and coloured residents. The legal 
arrangements were often unclear or inadequate, and in most cases, the black 
farmers used the land communally. This paper reflects on the black “emergent 
farmers”, who keep livestock on municipal commonage.  
 
Information is still sparse about the use of municipal commonage. Until now, 
there has been a lack of understanding of the kind of people who use 
municipal commonage, their background, their knowledge base, and their 
economic goals. This paper is based on in-depth interviews with 28 
commonage users, undertaken in Philippolis in the Southern Free State. The 
paper shows the diversity of commonage users, using the following key 
indicators:  (1) socio-economic background;  (2) different types of commonage 
 
2 “Municipal commonage” should be distinguished from Namaqualand’s “Act 9 
commonage”, also known as the “coloured reserves”, introduced by the National Party 
Government, as part of its Bantustan policy. (Namaqualand, on the west coast of South 
Africa, was destined to be a “coloured homeland” under the apartheid regime, and hence 
significant land parcels were acquired for the use of “coloured” residents). Much of 
Namaqualand’s commonages are centred upon small and remote rural villages, which have 
used rangelands for several decades, originally governed by Management Boards, and after 
1987, by the coloured “House of Representatives”. These areas were only brought under 
municipal jurisdictions in 2000. There have been several studies of Namaqualand’s “Act 9” 
commonage (for example, Wellman, 2000; Rohde et al, 2002). 
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use (based on the scale of livestock enterprises);  (3) economic ambitions;  and 
(4) views regarding land ownership. 
 
There is some doubt about the actual role of commonage within the broader 
land reform programme. This paper reflects on two policy questions: 
 
1.  Should commonage play a meaningful role as part of government’s land 
reform strategy? 
 
2.  Can commonage be regarded as a useful starting-point for emergent 
farmers, and as a “stepping-stone” towards individual land tenure?  
 
In this paper, it is argued that commonage may function as a “nursery” for 
potential commercial farmers, and that, by means of a “step-up” strategy, 
commonage users can “graduate” from commonage towards individually 
utilised parcels of land. Land reform policies need to take cognisance of 
commonage development, in cases where commonage users are ready to 
become more commercially-oriented agriculturalists. As such, they are ideal 
candidates for land redistribution grants. The paper therefore challenges the 
view espoused by Anderson and Pienaar (2003) and Rohde (2003) that 
commonage use is primarily a survivalist activity, and should remain so. 
 
The paper will also argue that, in order for commonage’s “stepping stone” 
potential to be exploited, a much more flexible set of land ownership options 
needs to be provided, to respond to the complexity of commonage users’ 
needs, resources and future ambitions. Only in this way can municipal 
commonage assist in South Africa’s land reform process. 
 
2.  The significance of municipal commonage in South Africa and the 
link with land reform 
 
There are several notable features of municipal commonage in South Africa. 
 
A first important factor is its sheer size. A survey of municipalities, conducted 
by Buso (2003), found that there are at least 112 795 ha of municipal 
commonage in the Free State. The figure for Northern Cape is approximately 1 
641 433 ha (Benseler, 2003), although this figure includes at least 1 million ha 
of Namaqualand “Act 9” land (Pienaar and May, 2003). Figures are not 
available for other provinces, although commonage is a typical feature of 
Western Cape and Eastern Cape towns. 
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An important issue affecting commonage development in these areas is the 
rapid urbanisation of the past 15 years. In 1996, South Africa’s rural 
p o p u l a t i o n  w a s  4 4 . 9  % ,  a n d  b y  2 0 0 1 ,  t h i s  h a d  d e c l i n e d  t o  4 2 . 5 %  o f  S o u t h  
Africa’s total population (StatsSA, 2001:8). The rural population had decreased 
by 830 000 people. Thousands of farm workers lost their jobs, as farmers cut 
labour costs due to the impacts of globalisation. The loss of agricultural jobs 
has been intensified by farmers’ fears about government land tenure policies 
(Simbi and Aliber, 2000). The Free State has been particularly hard hit by 
urbanisation trends: 
 
Table 1:  The urban population per settlement category in the Free State, 
1991 and 2001  
 






1991  1 028 841  124 042  257 515  245 168 
2001  1 097 182  158 617  355 661  435 607 
% change per annum 1991–2001  0,9  3,1  3,5  8,9 
Source:  Marais, 2004 
 
The influx of people into the small towns has substantially increased the 
pressure on municipal commonage, as the constantly increasing numbers of 
urban poor want to use this resource to maintain their livelihoods.  
 
A significant amount of research has highlighted the administrative difficulties 
of municipalities, the poor management practices of commonage committees, 
the unresolved attitudes of the Department of Land Affairs, and the patchy 
support of provincial Departments of Agriculture  (Cartwright, Benseler and 
Harrison’s study of Emthanjeni Municipality in De Aar (2004);  Buso (2003);  
Benseler (2003);  Benseler’s study of the Pofadder area (2003); and Atkinson, 
Benseler and Pienaar, 2005).  
 
However, a lacuna in the research to date consists in the understanding of 
commonage farmers’ attitudes towards agriculture, and their goals about 
future development. There has been the temptation, on the part of 
municipalities and DLA policy-makers, to regard commonage users as a single 
undifferentiated category. The Philippolis study was concerned to uncover the 
important variations within this category, in terms of socio-economic status 
and resources; scale of commonage farming enterprises; and their future goals. 
 
The overriding argument, in this paper, is that, until one understands the 
divergent dynamics of commonage use, one cannot suitable land access 
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policies and technical support programmes to support commonage farmers. 
The corollary of this argument is that until one understands the dynamics of 
commonage use better, it also hard to situate the role of commonage within 
the broader land reform debate within South Africa, which is the main 
objective in this paper.  
 
In the literature, there have been calls for commonage to be regarded as a key 
part of land reform. Anderson and Pienaar (2003:31) argue that: 
 
“Commonage provides a relatively inexpensive and potentially 
very effective option for land reform. The municipal government 
system means that the necessary regulatory framework for rights 
administration and land management is already in place. 
Municipal legislation both empowers local authorities to act as 
agents of development and ensures that management is devolved 
to the lowest possible level. The municipality as the land holding 
entity is not a top-down, absentee landlord, but a key agent of 
local economic development.” 
 
There are four arguments for commonage being an important aspect of land 
reform. Firstly, commonage land is often the only natural resource available 
for poor urban communities, particularly in land-locked areas without access 
to fisheries. Commonage is readily accessible to the poor, because it is located 
close to residential areas, and does not require much capital to develop. It 
should therefore be a first-line strategy for supporting household food 
production. 
 
Secondly, municipalities already own commonage land. It does not have to be 
purchased at great expense. This suggests that commonage development has 
prima facie importance as a component of land reform. 
 
Thirdly, commonage development has – in theory - great potential for spin-off 
economic development, such as local markets, local capital accumulation, local 
skills training, and linkages between farms and non-farm activities. Non-farm 
activities are important to the welfare of farm households in sub-Saharan 
Africa, for immediate food security through providing money to buy food, to 
buy farm inputs, and to provide outlets for production (Machethe, Reardon 
and Mead, 1997:377).  
 
Fourthly, it offers a valuable opportunity for experience and learning in 
collaborative or co-operative social institutions, such as commonage 
committees, farmers’ associations, banks and  co-operatives. These institutions 
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are typically located in the small towns. Commonage is therefore a valuable 
“school for economic citizenship” for people who have been marginalised and 
disempowered for almost all their lives. It can also help in creating a new 
generation of young farmers, and thereby restore the image of agriculture as 
an attractive career option. 
 
However, the potential of commonage as an important component of land 
reform is open to two different interpretations. One view regards commonage 
primarily as a survivalist activity:  “For the majority of South Africa’s rural 
poor, owning livestock acts as a buffer against destitution caused by 
unemployment or failure to receive sufficient income by other means” 
(Anderson and Pienaar, 2003:20). For these authors, subsistence agriculture on 
commonage land is not an incipient, or embryonic, form of commercial 
agriculture. They are supported by Rohde et al (2001:2), who argue that 
production objectives between commercial and subsistence forms of 
agriculture, and consequently management approaches, differ radically. 
Anderson and Pienaar argue that few commonage participants can in fact 
afford to access land through the LRAD programme, since they would not 
qualify for enough land for a viable commercial farming venture. For these 
authors, commonage should not be seen as a springboard for more 
commercial types of land reform, such as LRAD. They bolster their argument 
by the fact that commonage farmers have not used commonage as a “stepping 
stone” to commercial farming options, and that there has been a low rate of 
“exit” from commonage (Hall, 2003). 
 
By default, the ANC Government’s commonage policy has remained a “pro-
poor” one, because it is biased towards survivalist users. In the mid-1990s, the 
ANC Government identified commonage as a pillar of its land reform 
programme. According to the White Paper on Land Policy (DLA, 1997): 
“In large parts of the country, in small rural towns and 
settlements, poor people need to gain access to grazing land and 
small arable / garden areas in order to supplement their income 
and to enhance household food security. The Department of Land 
Affairs will encourage local authorities to develop the conditions 
that will enable poor residents to access existing commonage, 
currently used for other purposes. Further, the Department will 
provide funds to enable resource-poor municipalities to acquire 
additional land for this purpose.”  
As part of the Government’s land reform programme, funding was made 
available to municipalities to purchase private farms to add to their 
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commonage holdings. Between 1996 and 2002, 78 commonage projects were 
funded by DLA, and a total of 420 812 ha were acquired by municipalities 
Anderson and Pienaar, 2003: 12), in terms of the Provision of Land and Assistance 
Act (Act 126 of 1993). This funding pattern has recently slowed significantly, 
perhaps indicating an official ambivalence about the merits of commonage as 
a part of land reform. 
 
DLA’s commonage policy accommodates “both subsistence and emergent 
farmers”, but these are required to be “poor residents” - although no 
definition of “poor” is provided (DLA, 2002: 10). In principle, DLA’s approach 
is amenable to the principle of commonage land as a stepping stone for 
farmers wishing to produce for the market and who will eventually come to 
own or rent private land for commercial farming. In its public 
pronouncements, DLA appeared to anticipate that such farmers would 
gradually move out of the commonage, but it remained profoundly unclear 
what would become of these farmers. DLA has not produced or actively 
encouraged an “exit strategy” for commonage users, whether for full-time or 
part-time farming. There has been no investigation of land access alternatives 
for commonage farmers who need to “exit” from commonage land; there is no 
government assistance for rental land; and there are no attempts to create a 
viable peri-urban spatial strategy for small-scale farmers (whether full-time or 
part-time). The fact that such alternatives have not featured in DLA’s policy 
pronouncements, with the exclusive focus on individual ownership of large 
tracts of agricultural land, means that commonage farmers’ options have been 
severely constrained. 
 
In practice, therefore, DLA’s approac h  t o  c o m m o n a g e  i s  b i a s e d  t o w a r d s  
subsistence use, simply because few viable exit options exist for commonage 
farmers. As will be shown below, this ambivalence surrounding commonage 
has led to disagreements amongst observers about what its primary purpose 
should be. 
 
The empirical data collected for this paper argues the opposite: municipal 
commonage can contribute to land reform, in the sense of providing an exit 
strategy for full-time or part-time emergent farmers, who want to farm on a 
more commercial basis. This is not to argue that all commonage should be 
used for emergent commercial farmers. It would be desirable to reserve some 
commonage land for the urban poor. But a much more systematic approach 
towards supporting emergent commercial farmers should be found. 
 
It is to this empirical data that we now turn, beginning with a short profile of 
the Philippolis commonage system. 
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3.  Philippolis commonage: A land system under strain 
 
Philippolis is located in the southern Free State, 30 km north of the Orange 
River. It is the oldest settlement in the Free State, dating from the 1820s, when 
it began as a mission station. Subsequently, the town became the capital of the 
Griqua kingdom (until 1862), and thereafter it was sold to the Free State 
Republic. 
 
Until 1999, Philippolis had its own municipality. In 2000, with the watershed 
re-demarcation of municipalities, Philippolis was absorbed into a larger 
municipal entity, called Kopanong Municipality. Kopanong includes eight 
other towns:  Trompsburg (the municipal capital), Fauresmith, Jagersfontein, 
Edenburg, Springfontein, Gariep Dam, Bethulie and Reddersburg. Each of 
these towns is now managed by a “Unit Supervisor”, and basic clerical and 
technical staff. Policy-making emanates from the headquarters in Trompsburg, 
60 km away from Philippolis. 
 
Like all the Karoo towns, Philippolis is a very poor community, and the level 
of poverty is increasing all the time, due to in-migration of unemployed and 
piece-work farm workers: 
 
Table 2:  Black and coloured income levels in Philippolis, 1996 and 2001 
 
  Number of households 
Income per annum  Black  Coloured 
  1996 2001 1996 2001 
R0-R2400 21  59  2  12 
2400-6000 150  166  28  71 
6000-12000  516 414 409 260 
12000-18000 131  159  41  91 
18000-30000 183  279  65  137 
30000-42000 56  123  69  65 
42000-54000  0 45 27 35 
54000-72000  0 29 27 38 
72000-96000 0  13  0  28 
96000-132000  53 17 75 33 
132000-192000 0  47  0  63 
192000-360000  0 0 0 0 
360000+  0 0 0 0 
Total 1110  1350  743  833 
 
Philippolis was one of the first municipalities in the Free State to make 
commonage available for local black stock-holders. It took this decision in 
1998, and thereby pre-empted much of the political conflict which came to 
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characterize commonage access in towns such as Trompsburg. Gradually, 
sections (called “camps”) of the commonage were leased to local black users, 
at reduced rentals. 
 
In Philippolis, the municipal commonage of 3 491 ha is divided into five 
camps and used for livestock farming. Buso (2003) gives a picture of the 
conditions prevailing on the commonage. Users of the commonage are 
organised into a stock committee, then consisting of 35 members, with seven 
members forming an executive council and each member paying R120 per 
annum. The committee maintains its own bank account. Access to the 
commonage land is fairly easy. The committee is open and accommodating, in 
the sense that people who used to work for commercial farmers but who had 
lost their jobs are welcome to join the committee, provided they produce a 
f o r m a l  l e t t e r  o f  r e q u e s t .  B y  2 0 0 5 ,  t h e  n u m b e r  o f  c o m m o n a g e  u s e r s  h a s  
increased to about 55. This is, by default, an “open access” system, and is 
certainly unsustainable in the medium- and long-term. 
 
The commonage management system in Kopanong Municipality is extremely 
fragmented and unclear. Each town in the municipality still manages its 
commonage in terms of contracts drafted before 2000, or those concluded on 
an  ad hoc basis since then. There is no commonage management policy. 
Kopanong Municipality has received funding from the Development Bank of 
South Africa to draft a commonage policy, but by August 2005, this had not 
yet commenced, due to bureaucratic delays within the municipality. During 
2006, DLA drafted a new set of commonage guidelines, with pro forma 
contracts and regulations. But these have not yet been officially promulgated 
and have therefore not yet made any impact on municipal practice. 
 
There are numerous management problems facing the Philippolis 
commonage. These stem primarily from the fact that the rights and obligations 
of the municipality and the commonage users are unclear. This leads to 
frustration for both parties. The unsatisfactory contractual system results in 
many dysfunctions, including poor maintenance of infrastructure, 
overgrazing, and poor payment of rentals. None of these problems is unique 
to Philippolis, as previous studies have already indicated (Benseler, 2003; 
Cartwright, Benseler and Harrison, 2004). 
 
By making commonage land available to collectives of black emergent 
farmers, municipalities’ difficulties have escalated. Not only are there many 
more management complexities when dealing with large groups of poorly 
organised commonage users, but the level of rentals for commonage land have 
been reduced drastically compared to the leases granted to commercial 
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farmers. This has led to a decline in municipal revenue. There is a real 
opportunity cost for municipalities in using commonage land for survivalist 
farmers.  
 
At present, there is no “exit system” from the Philippolis commonage. The 
commonage committee re-negotiates its contract with the municipality every 
five years, and commonage users are virtually assured that they can use the 
commonage land in the long-term. Furthermore, the lack of municipal 
monitoring of livestock numbers means that there is effectively no limit to the 
number of livestock which can be kept on the commonage. The Stock 
Committee believes that there is a dire shortage of camps because users own 
large and growing numbers of sheep and goats (Buso, 2003:60).  
 
4.  The Philippolis survey 
 
In the Philippolis survey, conducted in May 2005, a total of 28 commonage 
farmers were interviewed. This represented half the current commonage 
users.  
 
Commonage farming is largely, but not exclusively, a male domain, with 79% 
of the livestock owners in the survey being men.  
 
Regarding age, Table 3 shows that commonage farming is attracting primarily 
middle-aged and elderly people: 
 
Table 3:  Age profile of Philippolis commonage users 
 
Age bracket  Number of users 
20-40 years  3 
41-60 years  15 
61+ years  10 
Total 28 
 
Table 4 shows their employment profile: 
 
Table 4:  Employment profile of Philippolis commonage users 
 
Employment status  Number of users  Percentage of users 
Full-time 11  39 
Odd jobs/piece work  5  18 
Retired/unemployed 12  43 
Total 28  100.0 
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The majority of the users are unemployed or retired, suggesting that their use 
of the commonage may well be a hedge against destitution. But eleven other 
commonage users had other sources of permanent income. The largest 
employment category was municipal workers (5 people, or 18% of the survey). 
Two people were employed as gardeners or labourers. Only two gave their 
profession as “farmer”, suggesting that they are currently committed to their 
commonage farming activities on a full-time basis. Furthermore, in nine of the 
28 cases (30%), another household member had an income. These findings 
pose key questions for the future:  Did people become wealthy due to stock-
ownership, or vice versa?   
 
The commonage land in Philippolis is used exclusively for livestock 
ownership, with no cultivation taking place. Of the 28 interviewees, the 
majority (20 people) own large stock (cattle). Sixteen people own small stock, 
such as sheep and goats. Ten people own pigs, and two people own horses 
and donkeys (mainly for transport purposes). 
 
The number of livestock owned by these farmers differs widely. In the 
Philippolis survey, the commonage users can be divided into four rough 
categories. The demarcation of these categories is somewhat arbitrary, but it 
does indicate that there is a continuum of farming scale on the Philippolis 
commonage: 
 
Table 5:  Categories of livestock ownership 
 




Group 1  Up to 10 head of livestock  16  57 
Group 2  Between 11 and 30 head of livestock  6  21 
Group 3  Between 31 and 100 head of livestock  4  4 
Group 4  More than 100 head of livestock  2  7 
 
It is tempting to assume that commonage land is being used primarily by 
those who have no other source of livelihood, i.e. as a subsistence hedge 
against food insecurity. But the facts reveal that several of the commonage 
users have other sources of livelihood. Table 6 shows that employment 
profiles are spread across all the stock ownership categories: 
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Table 6:  Sources of earnings of commonage users 
 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Total 
Fulltime jobs  5  2  2  2  11 
Part-time jobs/Odd jobs  3  2  0  0  5 
Retired/Unemployed 8  2  2  0  12 
Total 16  6  4  2  28 
 
This suggests that people’s livelihood profiles are very divergent. Some people 
may have substantial monetary resources from salaries and wages, and 
plough this income into their stock farming. Other people with the same 
monetary income may have only a few head of livestock. Several farmers (39% 
of the survey) have full-time jobs, suggesting that they do farming as a hobby, 
or because they want a supplementary source of income. The issue of 
livelihoods is, of course, a much more complex one than these typologies 
reflect. A more detailed study would be required to investigate the complex 
linkages between revenue from farming, combined with employment, 
pensions, remittances, informal trading, and services. 
 
Another way of assessing the asset profile of the commonage users is to 
compare people’s livestock ownership with their type of occupation.  
 
Table 7:  Commonage users’ professions 
 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3  Group 4  Total 
Unemployed/retired 10  3  2  0  12 
Gardener/labourer 1  1  0  0  2 
Municipal worker  4  0  0  1  5 
Domestic worker  1  1  0  0  2 
Farmer 0  0  1  1  2 
Businessmen 0  1  1  0  2 
Total 16  6  4  2  28 
 
The largest category of employed people is that of municipal workers. These 
are relatively highly paid workers in small towns, a l t h o u g h  b y  n o  m e a n s  
wealthy. Two of the middle-range livestock owners are businessmen. Two 
commonage users already define themselves as “farmers”, indicating that they 
regard themselves as beyond the category of part-time stock owner.  
 
The interviewees were asked about their ownership of various assets, 
including houses, vehicles and agricultural land. Ownership of assets was 
fairly evenly distributed amongst Group 1-4, suggesting that Group 1 stock 
owners (with the smallest number of livestock) are not necessarily the poorest 
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of the farmers. For example, four of the 16 members of Group 1 own a car, and 
two own a pick-up truck;  in the case of Group 2, all six own a vehicle.   
 
The analysis shows that the characteristics of commonage users differ greatly. 
Some of the Group 1 farmers are indeed poor, with few assets, and their few 
head of livestock enable them to “survive”, or eke out a living. But there are 
many others who have other assets and income streams. Their livelihood 
profiles are evidently very different and complex. 
 
This is consonant with other studies which have shown the diversity of rural 
livelihood strategies, even under ostensibly similar living conditions. For 
example, Low, Akwenye and Kamwi (1999: 340), writing about northern 
Namibia, differentiate between “subsistence family farms” and “commercial 
family farms”. Makhura, Goode and Coetzee (1998: 440) found seven 
categories of farmers in the KaNgwane area, viz.“very low commercial 
households”, “moderately commercial households”, “high agricultural 
commercial households”, “livestock commercial households”, “non-farm 
income commercial households”, non-farm and agricultural commercial 
households”, and “highly commercial households”. Anseeuw et al (2001) 
distinguish between seven categories: the autonomous farmers, the livestock 
holders, the regular income earners, the irregular income earners, the family 
dependants, the social transfer dependants and the poorest residents. This 
study observed that micro-level diversity tends to be high, due to the unequal 
distribution of means conditioning farming production (such as access to 
financial resources, markets and knowledge). 
 
5.  Commonage users’ agricultural goals 
 
Clearly, there is a continuum of income and wealth levels amongst the 
Philippolis commonage users. It is not self-evident why commonage users 
want to keep livestock. They may constitute a new agricultural class, or their 
farming activity may be the sign of desperation and poverty. Is may be their 
first choice for a livelihood, or a fall-back option after everything else has 
failed. Stock ownership may constitute a new type of agricultural 
commercialism, or it may simply be a type of insurance policy against a “rainy 
day”. These are the underlying motivations for the survey. Although the 
findings are not always definitive, they do provide some trends; and they also 
provide indications of how similar studies should be methodologically refined 
in future. 
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In the Philippolis survey, all the commonage farmers (with the exception of 
one) wanted to increase their livestock. Might this indicate that they aspire to 
becoming commercial farmers? 
 
Table 8 shows that people use commonage for a wide variety of reasons: 
 
Table 8:  Reasons for commonage use in Philippolis  
 




Additional income/commercial reasons  13  36 
Personal progress  2  6 
Customary practice  2  6 
Emotional commitment (“I love to farm”/ 
“I love my animals”) 
13 36 
Long term investment  2  6 
To gain farming knowledge  4  11 
Total 36  100 
 
Commercial considerations (additional income, long term investment) are 
prevalent. But just as many regard farming as important from a subjective 
point of view, as a form of personal progress or as an emotional commitment. 
The work of Ferguson (1994), on the concept of the ‘bovine mystique’, suggests 
that non-commercial motives may be very important for livestock ownership. 
Some individuals want to improve their farming knowledge. This complexity 
suggests that some commonage users may wish to farm commercially, whereas 
others may prefer to farm primarily for subsistence, or for recreational or 
cultural reasons. 
 
The interests of various commonage users evidently diverge quite widely. It is 
tempting to conclude that Group 1 commonage users, who own the least 
livestock, are the poorest, and Group 4 the wealthiest.  It is also tempting to 
assume that Group 1 farmers have survivalist motives, whereas Group 4 
farmers want to farm commercially. However, neither of these assumptions is 
necessarily true. Commonage users may have very different levels of income 
or assets, and they may hold different numbers of stock for very different 
reasons.  
 
The Group 1-4 schema in Table 5 intersects with another typology, reflecting 
the commonage users’ livelihood strategies and agricultural ambitions. By 
combining the resource base and farming motivations of the Philippolis 
commonage users, we derived the following categorization: 
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•  Survivalists:  Households with few alternative sources of income 
(perhaps other than social grants or pensions), and who are likely to 
continue using livestock to fulfill basic food security needs. 
•  Micro-farmers:  They have other livelihoods, and want to keep only a 
certain limited number of livestock, as an income supplement, or as a 
hobby, or for cultural purposes. 
•  Emergent small-scale farmers:  They show signs of commercialization:  for 
example, they may have bank accounts, they would like access to loans, 
they may want to farm on their own (i.e. not in a group), and they 
would like to farm on a larger scale, to make some profit. These farmers 
may be good candidates for ownership of small-holdings, where they 
could either undertake small-scale agriculture, or combine this with 
other income-generating activities. 
•  Proto-capitalist farmers:  People who may have other livelihoods, but 
would like to go into commercial farming on a full-time or large-scale 
basis. For them, livestock and capital accumulation is important. 
Acquiring property may also be important. These farmers would be 
ideal candidates for a “step-up” land reform strategy, i.e. opting out of 
commonage use and finding their own farm. 
 
The Philippolis survey shows that there is no obvious correlation between the 
farming motivations of farmers and their current level of stock ownership. A 
Group 1 person, for example, may be either a survivalist, or a micro-farmer, or 
an emergent small-scale farmer, or a proto-capitalist farmer. Their current 
level of stock ownership is no indication of why they want to farm. Their goals 
are as important as their level of stock ownership, although the scale of their 
farming enterprises may differ. Some people may have only a few head of 
livestock, but, given the opportunity, may want to become emergent small-
scale farmers, or proto-capitalist farmers. Other people may own quite large 
numbers of cattle or sheep, but do not have any real ambition to grow their 
farming enterprises on a commercial basis.  
 
Consequently commonage management planning should include scope for a 
variety of economic, spatial and land tenure options. Some users are likely to 
prefer to remain on the commonage land, whether on an individual or 
communal tenure basis, whereas other s  m a y  w i s h  t o  “ e x i t ”  f r o m  t h e  
commonage and acquire or rent small holdings or farms. 
 
The survey attempted to explore the extent of commonage users’ commercial 
motives. In this study, five hypotheses were constructed to illustrate the 
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degree of commercialization of commonage users:  (1) commonage users are 
willing to purchase inputs improve their livestock, (2) users sell their livestock, 
(3) users are willing to pay a reasonable rental in order to access more 
commonage land, (4) users would prefer to farm individually instead of 
communally, and (5) users would prefer to own their own land. 
 
These are not ideal indicators. For example, commercialization is not 
necessarily conceptually tied to land ownership, nor is it tied to full-time 
farming. Furthermore, these indicators are somewhat susceptible to influence 
by extraneous factors, as will be shown below. These nuances could not be 
explored within the scope of the survey. Nevertheless, they offer an 
approximate assessment of commonage users’ farming goals. 
 
5.1  Investment into farming operating costs 
 
Commonage users were asked how much money they spent on veterinary 
medicine, home-made medicine, dipping, fodder, and the repairs of 
commonage infrastructure (such as fences, pumps, troughs and pipes). 
 
Table 9:  Expenditure on livestock 
 




R0-R100 8  29 
R101- R500  8  29 
R501- R1000  3  11 
R1001- R2000  6  21 
More than R2001  3  11 
Total 28  100 
 
Table 9 shows that the majority of farmers spent relatively little (less than 
R800), but nine interviewees spent more than R1000.  
 
This proxy indicator is not totally effective, because the significance of these 
amounts as an indicator of financial investment depends greatly on the 
a m o u n t  o f  i n c o m e  e a r n e d  b y  t h e  c o m m onage users. Nevertheless, it does 
suggest that several of the Philippolis commonage users are ploughing large 
amounts of money into their livestock enterprises. 
 
5.2  The sale of livestock 
 
The sale of livestock is a possible indicator of the degree of commercialization 
of commonage users. However, this can represent two different types of 
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commercialization, depending on the use of the revenue generated. If the 
revenue is used for household needs, it shows a limited involvement in the 
market; but if the revenue is ploughed back into the farming enterprise, it 
suggests that agricultural investment is important. A further consideration is 
that a distinction should be made between “distress sales” and sales in a 
context of prosperity. This is an issue which should be explored more fully in 
future research. 
 
The sale of livestock is not a perfect proxy indicator for commercialization, 
because it may be influenced by the accessibility of local markets and abattoirs 
(Buso 2003), as well as the condition of the livestock. Commonage users tend 
to be reluctant to sell livestock during periods of drought, because the 
livestock is in poor condition (Stock Committee chairman, pers comm.). 
 
As Table 10 shows, the majority of commonage users had not sold livestock in 
the previous year: 
 
Table 10:  Sale of livestock 
 
  No animals sold  1-10 animals sold  >10 sold  Total 
Group 1  14  2  0  16 
Group 2  3  2  1  6 
Group 3  1  1  2  4 
Group 4  0  1  1  2 
Total 18  6  4  28 
 
A relatively small number had sold between 1 and 10 head of livestock, and an 
even smaller number had sold more than 10 head of livestock. Clearly, for 
many commonage users, stock sales are not a major feature of commonage 
use. This suggests that the users that they ‘bank’ their wealth in their livestock 
– a phenomenon which becomes a huge problem for environmental 
management. 
 
The sale of larger numbers of livestock occurred amongst those farmers who 
have a relatively large herd or flock. These farmers are becoming more 
“commercial” in their farming orientation, where “commercialization” can be 
defined as the selling of agricultural products, or working off-farm to earn an 
income which is used to acquire other basic household goods (Makhura, 
Goode and Coetzee, 1998). 
 
When comparing livestock sales with the categories of full-time employment, 
part-time employment, and unemployed, there does not appear to be a 
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correlation. Of the four people who had sold relatively large numbers of 
livestock (more than 10 animals), two were in the unemployed category, and 
two were employed full-time.  
 
The sale of animals was also compared with the professions of the commonage 
users. It might be expected that unemployed or retired commonage users, or 
those with poorly paid jobs, would sell some of their livestock to generate an 
income. Six of the twelve unemployed commonage users had sold livestock in 
the previous year. This left six unemployed commonage users who had not 
sold any livestock, who may either be accumulating their herds, or preferring 
to use livestock for other purposes, such as slaughter, milk production or 
social and ceremonial functions. Presumably these residents are able to live off 
other income sources, such as pensions, wages of family members, or 
remittances. 
 
Another way of understanding people’s commercial motivations is to ask how 
they used the proceeds of livestock sales. Of the ten people who had sold 
livestock, five had used the money for household expenses (indicating a 
primarily subsistence use of livestock), while five had ploughed the money 
back into their farming activities (suggesting a more investment-oriented 
approach to farming). One person used the revenue for both household and 
investment purposes. Four had saved the money. 
 
These findings show that there is a whole range of motivations among 
commonage users, as well as numerous livelihood strategies. An important 
aspect of an improved commonage policy would be to understand the variety 
of motivations of commonage users, so that appropriate livelihood options can 
be designed, from which people can make their own choices. Such strategies 
should include a mix of land access options, different sizes of land parcels, 
different types of extension services, and a range of financial support 
mechanisms. 
 
5.3  Commonage farmers’ willingness to pay rental for more access to land 
 
Commonage farmers’ willingness to pay rental can be used as a proxy 
indicator for their desire to farm commercially. It is hypothesised that farmers 
who wish to farm commercially would be eager to expand their access to land, 
and would be willing to pay rent to secure such access. Once again, this is not 
a perfect indicator, because commonage users’ willingness to pay rent is 
influenced by the poor condition of municipal infrastructure (Buso 2003), as 
well as poorly enforced lease arrangements.  
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There is also some disagreement about what constitutes a “reasonable rental”. 
In Philippolis, current rental levels are highly subsidised, and are much lower 
than the commercial levels of land rentals (Buso, 2003: 29). The Stock 
Committee is required to pay an amount of R11 000 to the municipality per 
annum. Kopanong Municipality still has no policy on commonage 
management or rentals. In the interviews, the figure of R50/head of 
livestock/annum was used as a guide. 
 
One way of testing commonage farmers’ seriousness about their future 
agricultural activities, is to ask whether they would be prepared to pay rent for 
additional land: 
 
Table 11:  Willingness to pay rent for more land 
 
  Yes No  Total 
Group 1  14  2  16 
Group 2  6  0  6 
Group 3  3  1  4 
Group 4  1  1  2 
Total 24  4  28 
 
In the Philippolis case study, the majority of interviewees claimed that they 
would be willing to pay rental if they secured additional land.  
 
There were four farmers who stated explicitly that they do not want to pay 
more rentals for additional land. Some black farmers still believe that land is a 
“free good”, and seem to want to be subsidised by the municipality in 
perpetuity. This raises questions about their degree of commercial thinking.  
 
The findings cannot be accepted as definitive. Farmers’ willingness to pay 
rentals may differ significantly, and they may well be giving what they 
consider to be the “right answer”. To some extent, the proof of the pudding 
will be in the eating, and it is only when farmers are really required to pay 
rentals, that their willingness will be tested. This suggests that future studies 
would have to ask more focused and refined questions, to understand what 
farmers are willing (and able) to pay.  
 
The Philippolis study, which indicates that the majority of commonage users 
are prepared to pay rental for additional commonage land, seems to contradict 
the currently poor levels of rental payments in many towns. Buso (2003: 33) 
found that 22 Free State towns experienced satisfactory payments, whereas 13 
towns experienced poor levels of payment. There has been no proper study of 
why some municipalities experience difficulties with rental payments, but 
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there are some preliminary indications that i t is  due to poorly-draf ted an d 
weakly enforced leasing systems. Many municipalities (including Kopanong 
Municipality, in whose jurisdiction Philippolis falls) determine the fees by 
hectare of land, and not according to head of livestock. The group as a whole is 
held responsible for the payment of rental for an entire field. In Philippolis, for 
example, payment is channelled through the Stock Committee. This has the 
advantage of relieving the municipality of the burden of having to collect the 
money from the individual farmers. But if the group structure is weak – as is 
the case in Philippolis - it is unable to extract people’s share of the rental. This 
leads to a Hardin-type “tragedy of the commons” (see Hardin 1968) and 
consequent overgrazing. The source of the problem is that insufficient 
attention has been paid by DLA, as well as by municipalities, to the legal 
dimensions of commonage management (Pienaar and May, 2003: 6; Anderson 
and Pienaar, 2003:21). 
 
There are two possible improvements to this dysfunctional leasing system. 
Firstly, if land is to be used communally, then rentals should be determined 
per head of livestock, and not per hectare. This would enable clear tracking of 
defaulters who fail to pay for the livestock they keep. Secondly, if land were to 
be leased per hectare, then it should not be based on communal use. It should 
be leased to individuals, who are made responsible for paying their lease. In 
both scenarios, a degree of individuation is necessary to keep individuals 
responsible for rental payments, and to prevent the “tragedy of the 
commons”. If such changes were made, and if municipalities were more likely 
to charge market-related fees for the use of commonage, the issue of rental 
payments would become a proxy indicator for commonage farmers’ 
commercial ambitions. 
 
Commonage users’ ambivalence towards paying rental suggests that: 
 
1.  Some farmers may still be relatively “uncommercialised”, in that they 
regard natural resources as communal resources, and are not willing to 
commit their own money to financing their agricultural overheads 
2.  Some farmers are willing to pay rentals, but the municipalities’ 
administrative systems and contract systems have been too weak to 
enforce payment 
3.  Some farmers are willing to pay rentals, if the problem of “free riding” 
can be addressed 
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4.  Some farmers may be more likely to “exit” from commonage onto their 
own land (with all the financial responsibilities that that entails), if more 
realistic commonage rentals were levied and enforced (Bradstock, 2003). 
 
To return to the question of commonage users’ seriousness about accessing 
more land, and being willing to pay for its use:  It is likely that the poor levels of 
rental payment experienced by so many municipalities does not reflect on 
commonage farmers’ willingness to pay for land use. Instead, it reflects on the 
currently inappropriate leasing systems. The willingness to pay additional 
rental is not a perfect indicator for the commercialization of commonage 
farmers, because farmer’s attitudes are affected by the dysfunctions of the 
current rental system. But it does suggest a degree of land hunger. It also 
suggests that, if the dysfunctions of the rental system were removed (such as 
the “free riding” problem associated with communal rental) can be overcome). 
 
5.4  A variety of commonage tenure options: Individual and communal 
tenure 
 
In most municipalities, commonage is utilized communally. Impressionistic 
evidence suggests that this is a source of frustration for commonage users, 
who are not able to manage the land according to their own judgment. In 
particular, those farmers who want to enlarge their livestock holdings are 
likely to become frustrated. This issue is therefore used as a proxy indicator for 
farmers’ desire to farm more commercially. 
 
In the Philippolis survey, a majority of commonage users (19 out of 28) want to 
farm on their own. Only nine stated specifically that they would prefer to farm 
communally. It is tempting to assume that the farmers who prefer a communal 
arrangement are those who are survivalists, but this would not necessarily be 
the case.  
 
However, the effectiveness of the indicator is somewhat undermined by the 
many management problems which farmers encounter, as reflected in Table 12: 
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Too much conflict in a group/difficult to manage  16  57 
Wants to work for his own benefit/keep produce for self  1  4 
Can keep more livestock  2  7 
Did not answer  9  32 
Total 28  100.0 
 
The table suggests widespread frustration with communal management. It 
also shows people’s frustration with the limited availability of land, and the 
belief that having one’s own land will enable more livestock to be kept (this is 
not entirely true, because it depends on the size of such land). It is only once 
such management problems are rectified, that the proxy indicator would be 
fully effective. 
 
5.5   Desire to own land 
 
A final test of commonage farmers’ desire to farm more commercially is their 
desire to own land of their own. This would indicate a willingness to invest in 
infrastructure and other requisites. 
 
Table 13 shows the overwhelming desire of Philippolis commonage users to 
own their own land: 
 





Yes 25  89.3 
No 3  10.7 
Total 28  100.0 
 
Table 14 shows the reasons which commonage users gave for wanting to own 
their own land: 
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Table 14:  Reasons for wanting to own a farm 
 
Reason for wanting to own a farm  Number of mentions  Percent 
Inheritance 2  8 
Post-retirement occupation  2  8 
Can make own decisions  14  54 
Can have more stock  7  27 
Want to grow vegetables  1  4 
Total 26  100 
 
Two main features are evident: People’s desire to manage their own land, and 
to increase their livestock holdings. This suggests that there is “land hunger” 
amongst commonage users. In some towns, the demand for agricultural land 
is reaching crisis proportions, and some towns (such as Trompsburg) have 
seen violent demonstrations and land invasions. 
 
It should be noted that there are problems and limitations of relying on 
hypothetical and attitudinal questions, since answers to these vary with 
people’s perceptions of the likelihood, and implications, of these conditions 
being realized. Furthermore, respondents may not be fully conversant with the 
practical and financial challenges associated with land ownership. A more 
realistic evaluation would also have to take cognisance of farmer’s resources, 
and their ability to use land effectively, as well as different potential sizes and 
locations of land parcels. As they stand, the findings are fairly abstract. 
However, they once again suggest two things:  The widespread desire to have 
access to land they can call their own (in whatever sense or scale), and the 
diversity of people’s motivations for wanting such land. Translated into a 
policy recommendation, this suggests the importance of exit options, and the 
need for a diversity of such options in practice. 
 
6. Policy  implications: Commonage as a land reform strategy 
 
There is an urgent need for municipalities to draft commonage management 
plans, to bring some order into their often chaotic management systems, and 
to get some kind of developmental vision for the future. To achieve this, 
sustained and holistic support will be needed from national departments such 
as Agriculture, Land Affairs, Provincial and Local Government, and Water 
Affairs and Forestry.  
  
By understanding commonage users’ experience, background, resources and 
developmental goals, much better local policies and institutions can be crafted. 
Their perspectives have significant implications for the drafting of future 
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policies. Commonage users have repeatedly urged government to purchase 
additional commonage land, or to assist commonage users to access their own 
land (Atkinson, Benseler and Pienaar, 2005).  
 
But as we have seen from the literature, most analysts do not see a role for 
municipal commonage in the broader land reform strategy mainly due to the 
current low rate of exit from the commonage (Hall, 2003). Concurrently, 
DLA’s expenditure on the commonage programme has declined. In 2002 only 
2% of land transferred within the redistribution programme was for municipal 
commonage (Anderson and Pienaar, 2003:7). Furthermore, the Department of 
Land Affairs is ambivalent about the role of commonage in the broader land 
reform scenario, because it is focused primarily on individual tenure in the 
LRAD programme, and  possibly because it is doubtful of municipal capacity 
to manage commonage land. 
 
Although there is some validity in all these arguments, the Philippolise case 
has shown them to have weaknesses too. We have identified five 
shortcomings in their arguments. The first is the assumption that commonage 
farmers want to engage in full-time agriculture (i.e. a single livelihood). In fact, 
it is quite possible that commonage users may want to farm part-time – and 
therefore “top up” their agricultural incomes with non-farm incomes. The 
importance of mixed livelihoods has been widely recognised in the literature. 
For example, Anseeuw et al (2001) have shown how diversification of incomes 
tends to reduce risks and uncertainties, while ensuring a basic food 
production for home consumption. 
 
The second fallacious assumption is that all commonage farmers are poor or 
destitute, battling for survival. As noted above, numerous studies have shown 
that emergent farmers, who have roughly similar land resources, tend to have 
very different agricultural strategies and levels of production. The Philippolis 
study suggests that commonage users’ resources are more complex than 
generally understood, and that fairly affluent residents, some with full-time 
employment, are using the municipal commonage. It can be argued that 
commonage users, particularly those have previous entrepreneurial 
experience, or who can plough their wages into farming, may be more 
successful land reform candidates than those with very few resources and 
with little experience in the modern economy. This does not imply that 
commonage users have to “graduate” to full-time farmers. Many of them will 
continue having diversified livelihoods, perhaps in a peri-urban area. 
However, given the increased chances that individually owned land offers it 
might be expected that many emergent farmers would spend more time on 
agriculture than before. 
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The third weakness of the argument is to use the current reluctance of 
commonage farmers to “exit” as evidence that they do not want to farm 
commercially. In fact, the regime of low rentals and poor enforcement of rental 
payment is probably the primary factor in encouraging commonage farmers 
not to venture into the more risky option of individual tenure (Bradstock, 
2003). 
 
The fourth factor is the paucity of appropriately sized land parcels located 
near the towns. Few towns have sufficient small-holdings and small farms 
available for commonage farmers who want to “exit” from commonage.  
 
The fifth factor is that DLA has turned down applications by commonage 
farmers for LRAD funding to purchase smallholdings. In Philippolis, several 
such cases have taken place during 2003-5. These applications were turned 
down – on the advice of Department of Agriculture officials - ostensibly 
because the smallholdings are too small to be economically viable. It is true, as 
Anderson and Pienaar (2003) note, that few commonage users have been able 
to afford to buy land through the LRAD programme. This is extremely 
unfortunate. Evidence suggests that this is not due to a lack of effort on their 
part. In 2002-3, the author assisted two commonage users in Philippolis to 
apply for land subsidies to purchase peri-urban plots, and both were turned 
down on the grounds that such plots are too small – even though they would 
have been ideal for part-time farming. 
 
This suggests that the concept of “mixed livelihoods” has not yet entered the 
lexicon of Free State DLA and DoA officials. Furthermore, the gradualist 
“stepping stone” view is not yet accepted by provincial DLA officials, who 
focus exclusively on purchasing large farms. Consequently, the required 
support systems (extension officers), appropriate land parcels, or credit 
systems, have simply not yet been made available for commonage farmers, to 
assist them to exit from commonage. 
 
It will be necessary to create appropriate land parcels for commonage users 
who decide to “step up” from commonage use. Such parcels of land may be 
smallholdings (rental or ownership), small farms, and eventually, 
commercially-sized farms. On the smaller land parcels, intensive agriculture 
or mixed rural-urban livelihoods could be practised. Land redistribution 
requires a range of land access options, for it to be meaningful to people with 
very different ambitions, resources and livelihoods. 
 
What the Philippolis case study shows, is not only the urgency for addressing 
commonage as part of a coherent land access system, but that a wide variety of 
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spatial and land tenure options needs to be provided. This would enable 
commonage users to “self-select” the land packages which they can afford, 
and which would suit their asset base and their economic goals. Such 
packages could include:   
•  Commonage-based communal farming (rental of camps on a group 
basis). 
•  Commonage-based individual farming (rental of camps on an individual 
basis). 
•  Individually or group-rented small-holdings. 
•  Individually or group-owned small-holdings. 
•  Individually or group-owned farms. 
 
The peri-urban areas would be a very good place to begin introducing such a 
basket of land options, as many towns already have small-holdings which 
have been demarcated and provided with appropriate infrastructural services.  
 
7.  Progress and innovations 
 
There have recently been some major steps forward in official thinking, even 
though the peri-urban scenario has not yet been explored. 
 
The first encouraging sign is the new Commonage Manual, drafted by the 
national office of the Department of Land Affairs. A key component of this 
manual is that it improves the leasing system, and makes provision for leasing 
of land by head of livestock, in addition to renting out parcels of land. This is 
likely to improve payment of fees and maintenance of infrastructure, and 
reduce overgrazing. The major question will be how this manual will be 
brought to municipalities’ attention, and how they will be assisted to 
implement it. 
 
A second intervention is the drafting of a commonage policy for Letsemeng 
Municipality in the Koffiefontein area of the Free State, and adjoining 
Kopanong Municipality. This policy was drafted by the Free State Department 
of Agriculture. It makes provision for three categories of livestock farmers. 
Category 1 farmers will be operating at the bottom of the scale, and will be 
new entrants into the commonage system, as well as small-scale subsistence 
farmers. There is a stipulated maximum number of animals for each farmer (5 
cattle, 30 sheep or 30 goats). They may stay on as Category 1 farmers for as 
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long as they want to, but stock reduction may be required to make room for 
new entrants. The municipality will assist with the provision of bulls and 
rams, with drought relief applications, and with the control of animal diseases. 
At least 50% of commonage land will be set aside for Category 1 farmers. 
 
Category 2 farmers will share a piece of land with a maximum of four other 
farmers. The maximum number of animals is 15 cattle or 90 sheep or goats. A 
farmer can remain in this category for a maximum of five years, and he or she 
will then be required to move to Category 3.  
 
Category 3 farmers are each allocated their own rented piece of land. The 
maximum number of animals a farmer can have is 30 cattle, 180 sheep, or 180 
goats. A farmer will be allowed to farm as a Category 3 farmer for a maximum 
period of three years, and then he or she must apply for an LRAD grant to buy 
a piece of land. The Department of Agriculture will assist in the application. 
 
This policy is a major step forward, because it creates a commonage system, 
which functions for clearly defined purposes – subsistence and the creation of 
new commercial farmers. It also shows that the two purposes are compatible, 
if managed appropriately. 
 
These innovations now need to be refined further, to bring on board the 




The experience of the Philippolis commonage users suggests that commonage 
land should be regarded as one land reform instrument within a suite of land 
reform strategies. The argument for commonage as a “stepping stone” to 
privately-owned land is of major importance here. Commonage offers 
opportunities for first-level accumulation of capital, entrepreneurial experience, 
and economic networks. As such, it is a key support for other land reform 
strategies. Commonage use promotes the commercialisation of emergent 
farmers, as some farmers are already selling agricultural surpluses, and use 
farm or off-farm revenue to plough back into their farming operations. 
 
While many commonage farmers will always remain “survivalist”, others are 
potentially suitable candidates for commercial agriculture. However, they are 
most likely to succeed as part-time farmers (i.e. pursuing “mixed 
livelihoods”), and not as full-time farmers. It will be important to recognise the 
diversity of commonage users. Extension support should be tailored more 
closely to different types of commonage user. It has been widely recognised 
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that farming households may respond differently towards development and 
support initiatives (e.g. Anseeuw et al, 2001). 
 
The use of commonage as a key component of a land reform strategy will have 
the advantage of bringing land reform closer to the urban poor, and 
simultaneously allowing more commercially-oriented small farmers to “step 
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